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Character Improvement 
Nicomachean Ethics
by Aristotle
350 BC
translated by W. D. Ross
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Nicomachean Ethics by Aristotle Book: 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 | |
Book 6, Chapter 1
Since we have previously said that one ought to choose that which is intermediate, not the excess nor the defect, and that the intermediate is determined by the dictates of the right rule, let us discuss the nature of these dictates. In all the states of character we have mentioned, as in all other matters, there is a mark to which the man who has the rule looks, and heightens or relaxes his activity accordingly, and there is a standard which determines the mean states which we say are intermediate between excess and defect, being in accordance with the right rule. But such a statement, though true, is by no means clear; for not only here but in all other pursuits which are objects of knowledge it is indeed true to say that we must not exert ourselves nor relax our efforts too much nor too little, but to an intermediate extent and as the right rule dictates; but if a man had only this knowledge he would be none the wiser, e.g. we should not know what sort of medicines to apply to our body if some one were to say 'all those which the medical art prescribes, and which agree with the practice of one who possesses the art'. Hence it is necessary with regard to the states of the soul also not only that this true statement should be made, but also that it should be determined what is the right rule and what is the standard that fixes it.
We divided the virtues of the soul and a said that some are virtues of character and others of intellect. Now we have discussed in detail the moral virtues; with regard to the others let us express our view as follows, beginning with some remarks about the soul. We said before that there are two parts of the soul -- that which grasps a rule or rational principle, and the irrational; let us now draw a similar distinction within the part which grasps a rational principle. And let it be assumed that there are two parts which grasp a rational principle -- one by which we contemplate the kind of things whose originative causes are invariable, and one by which we contemplate variable things; for where objects differ in kind the part of the soul answering to each of the two is different in kind, since it is in virtue of a certain likeness and kinship with their objects that they have the knowledge they have. Let one of these parts be called the scientific and the other the calculative; for to deliberate and to calculate are the same thing, but no one deliberates about the invariable. Therefore the calculative is one part of the faculty which grasps a rational principle. We must, then, learn what is the best state of each of these two parts; for this is the virtue of each.
Book 6, Chapter 2
The virtue of a thing is relative to its proper work. Now there are three things in the soul which control action and truth -- sensation, reason, desire.
Of these sensation originates no action; this is plain from the fact that the lower animals have sensation but no share in action.
What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice, and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the intellect which is contemplative, not practical nor productive, the good and the bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state is truth in agreement with right desire.
The origin of action -- its efficient, not its final cause -- is choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intellect and character. Intellect itself, however, moves nothing, but only the intellect which aims at an end and is practical; for this rules the productive intellect, as well, since every one who makes makes for an end, and that which is made is not an end in the unqualified sense (but only an end in a particular relation, and the end of a particular operation) -- only that which is done is that; for good action is an end, and desire aims at this. Hence choice is either desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire, and such an origin of action is a man. (It is to be noted that nothing that is past is an object of choice, e.g. no one chooses to have sacked Troy; for no one deliberates about the past, but about what is future and capable of being otherwise, while what is past is not capable of not having taken place; hence Agathon is right in saying
For this alone is lacking even to God, To make undone things that have once been done.
The work of both the intellectual parts, then, is truth. Therefore the states that are most strictly those in respect of which each of these parts will reach truth are the virtues of the two parts.
Book 6, Chapter 3
Let us begin, then, from the beginning, and discuss these states once more. Let it be assumed that the states by virtue of which the soul possesses truth by way of affirmation or denial are five in number, i.e. art, scientific knowledge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, intuitive reason; we do not include judgement and opinion because in these we may be mistaken.
Now what scientific knowledge is, if we are to speak exactly and not follow mere similarities, is plain from what follows. We all suppose that what we know is not even capable of being otherwise; of things capable of being otherwise we do not know, when they have passed outside our observation, whether they exist or not. Therefore the object of scientific knowledge is of necessity. Therefore it is eternal; for things that are of necessity in the unqualified sense are all eternal; and things that are eternal are ungenerated and imperishable. Again, every science is thought to be capable of being taught, and its object of being learned. And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the Analytics also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by syllogism. Now induction is the starting-point which knowledge even of the universal presupposes, while syllogism proceeds from universals. There are therefore starting-points from which syllogism proceeds, which are not reached by syllogism; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired. Scientific knowledge is, then, a state of capacity to demonstrate, and has the other limiting characteristics which we specify in the Analytics, for it is when a man believes in a certain way and the starting-points are known to him that he has scientific knowledge, since if they are not better known to him than the conclusion, he will have his knowledge only incidentally.
Let this, then, be taken as our account of scientific knowledge.
Book 6, Chapter 4
In the variable are included both things made and things done; making and acting are different (for their nature we treat even the discussions outside our school as reliable); so that the reasoned state of capacity to act is different from the reasoned state of capacity to make. Hence too they are not included one in the other; for neither is acting making nor is making acting. Now since architecture is an art and is essentially a reasoned state of capacity to make, and there is neither any art that is not such a state nor any such state that is not an art, art is identical with a state of capacity to make, involving a true course of reasoning. All art is concerned with coming into being, i.e. with contriving and considering how something may come into being which is capable of either being or not being, and whose origin is in the maker and not in the thing made; for art is concerned neither with things that are, or come into being, by necessity, nor with things that do so in accordance with nature (since these have their origin in themselves). Making and acting being different, art must be a matter of making, not of acting. And in a sense chance and art are concerned with the same objects; as Agathon says, 'art loves chance and chance loves art'. Art, then, as has been is a state concerned with making, involving a true course of reasoning, and lack of art on the contrary is a state concerned with making, involving a false course of reasoning; both are concerned with the variable.
Book 6, Chapter 5
Regarding practical wisdom we shall get at the truth by considering who are the persons we credit with it. Now it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself, not in some particular respect, e.g. about what sorts of thing conduce to health or to strength, but about what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in general. This is shown by the fact that we credit men with practical wisdom in some particular respect when they have calculated well with a view to some good end which is one of those that are not the object of any art. It follows that in the general sense also the man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom. Now no one deliberates about things that are invariable, nor about things that it is impossible for him to do. Therefore, since scientific knowledge involves demonstration, but there is no demonstration of things whose first principles are variable (for all such things might actually be otherwise), and since it is impossible to deliberate about things that are of necessity, practical wisdom cannot be scientific knowledge nor art; not science because that which can be done is capable of being otherwise, not art because action and making are different kinds of thing. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is a true and reasoned state of capacity to act with regard to the things that are good or bad for man. For while making has an end other than itself, action cannot; for good action itself is its end. It is for this reason that we think Pericles and men like him have practical wisdom, viz. because they can see what is good for themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider that those can do this who are good at managing households or states. (This is why we call temperance (sophrosune) by this name; we imply that it preserves one's practical wisdom (sozousa tan phronsin). Now what it preserves is a judgement of the kind we have described. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasant and painful objects destroy and pervert, e.g. the judgement that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only judgements about what is to be done. For the originating causes of the things that are done consist in the end at which they are aimed; but the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain forthwith fails to see any such originating cause -- to see that for the sake of this or because of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the originating cause of action.) Practical wisdom, then, must be a reasoned and true state of capacity to act with regard to human goods. But further, while there is such a thing as excellence in art, there is no such thing as excellence in practical wisdom; and in art he who errs willingly is preferable, but in practical wisdom, as in the virtues, he is the reverse. Plainly, then, practical wisdom is a virtue and not an art. There being two parts of the soul that can follow a course of reasoning, it must be the virtue of one of the two, i.e. of that part which forms opinions; for opinion is about the variable and so is practical wisdom. But yet it is not only a reasoned state; this is shown by the fact that a state of that sort may forgotten but practical wisdom cannot.
Book 6, Chapter 6
Scientific knowledge is judgement about things that are universal and necessary, and the conclusions of demonstration, and all scientific knowledge, follow from first principles (for scientific knowledge involves apprehension of a rational ground). This being so, the first principle from which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge, of art, or of practical wisdom; for that which can be scientifically known can be demonstrated, and art and practical wisdom deal with things that are variable. Nor are these first principles the objects of philosophic wisdom, for it is a mark of the philosopher to have demonstration about some things. If, then, the states of mind by which we have truth and are never deceived about things invariable or even variable are scientific knowlededge, practical wisdom, philosophic wisdom, and intuitive reason, and it cannot be any of the three (i.e. practical wisdom, scientific knowledge, or philosophic wisdom), the remaining alternative is that it is intuitive reason that grasps the first principles.
Book 6, Chapter 7
Wisdom (1) in the arts we ascribe to their most finished exponents, e.g. to Phidias as a sculptor and to Polyclitus as a maker of portrait-statues, and here we mean nothing by wisdom except excellence in art; but (2) we think that some people are wise in general, not in some particular field or in any other limited respect, as Homer says in the Margites,
Him did the gods make neither a digger nor yet a ploughman
Nor wise in anything else.
Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not only know what follows from the first principles, but must also possess truth about the first principles. Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason combined with scientific knowledge -- scientific knowledge of the highest objects which has received as it were its proper completion.
Of the highest objects, we say; for it would be strange to think that the art of politics, or practical wisdom, is the best knowledge, since man is not the best thing in the world. Now if what is healthy or good is different for men and for fishes, but what is white or straight is always the same, any one would say that what is wise is the same but what is practically wise is different; for it is to that which observes well the various matters concerning itself that one ascribes practical wisdom, and it is to this that one will entrust such matters. This is why we say that some even of the lower animals have practical wisdom, viz. those which are found to have a power of foresight with regard to their own life. It is evident also that philosophic wisdom and the art of politics cannot be the same; for if the state of mind concerned with a man's own interests is to be called philosophic wisdom, there will be many philosophic wisdoms; there will not be one concerned with the good of all animals (any more than there is one art of medicine for all existing things), but a different philosophic wisdom about the good of each species.
But if the argument be that man is the best of the animals, this makes no difference; for there are other things much more divine in their nature even than man, e.g., most conspicuously, the bodies of which the heavens are framed. From what has been said it is plain, then, that philosophic wisdom is scientific knowledge, combined with intuitive reason, of the things that are highest by nature. This is why we say Anaxagoras, Thales, and men like them have philosophic but not practical wisdom, when we see them ignorant of what is to their own advantage, and why we say that they know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but useless; viz. because it is not human goods that they seek.
Practical wisdom on the other hand is concerned with things human and things about which it is possible to deliberate; for we say this is above all the work of the man of practical wisdom, to deliberate well, but no one deliberates about things invariable, nor about things which have not an end, and that a good that can be brought about by action. The man who is without qualification good at deliberating is the man who is capable of aiming in accordance with calculation at the best for man of things attainable by action. Nor is practical wisdom concerned with universals only -- it must also recognize the particulars; for it is practical, and practice is concerned with particulars. This is why some who do not know, and especially those who have experience, are more practical than others who know; for if a man knew that light meats are digestible and wholesome, but did not know which sorts of meat are light, he would not produce health, but the man who knows that chicken is wholesome is more likely to produce health.
Now practical wisdom is concerned with action; therefore one should have both forms of it, or the latter in preference to the former. But of practical as of philosophic wisdom there must be a controlling kind.
Book 6, Chapter 8
Political wisdom and practical wisdom are the same state of mind, but their essence is not the same. Of the wisdom concerned with the city, the practical wisdom which plays a controlling part is legislative wisdom, while that which is related to this as particulars to their universal is known by the general name 'political wisdom'; this has to do with action and deliberation, for a decree is a thing to be carried out in the form of an individual act. This is why the exponents of this art are alone said to 'take part in politics'; for these alone 'do things' as manual labourers 'do things'.
Practical wisdom also is identified especially with that form of it which is concerned with a man himself -- with the individual; and this is known by the general name 'practical wisdom'; of the other kinds one is called household management, another legislation, the third politics, and of the latter one part is called deliberative and the other judicial. Now knowing what is good for oneself will be one kind of knowledge, but it is very different from the other kinds; and the man who knows and concerns himself with his own interests is thought to have practical wisdom, while politicians are thought to be busybodies; hence the word of Euripides,
But how could I be wise, who might at ease,
Numbered among the army's multitude,
Have had an equal share?
For those who aim too high and do too much.
Those who think thus seek their own good, and consider that one ought to do so. From this opinion, then, has come the view that such men have practical wisdom; yet perhaps one's own good cannot exist without household management, nor without a form of government. Further, how one should order one's own affairs is not clear and needs inquiry.
What has been said is confirmed by the fact that while young men become geometricians and mathematicians and wise in matters like these, it is thought that a young man of practical wisdom cannot be found. The cause is that such wisdom is concerned not only with universals but with particulars, which become familiar from experience, but a young man has no experience, for it is length of time that gives experience; indeed one might ask this question too, why a boy may become a mathematician, but not a philosopher or a physicist. It is because the objects of mathematics exist by abstraction, while the first principles of these other subjects come from experience, and because young men have no conviction about the latter but merely use the proper language, while the essence of mathematical objects is plain enough to them?
Further, error in deliberation may be either about the universal or about the particular; we may fall to know either that all water that weighs heavy is bad, or that this particular water weighs heavy.
That practical wisdom is not scientific knowledge is evident; for it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular fact, since the thing to be done is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to intuitive reason; for intuitive reason is of the limiting premisses, for which no reason can be given, while practical wisdom is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of scientific knowledge but of perception -- not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well as in that of the major premiss there will be a limit. But this is rather perception than practical wisdom, though it is another kind of perception than that of the qualities peculiar to each sense.
Book 6, Chapter 9
There is a difference between inquiry and deliberation; for deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing. We must grasp the nature of excellence in deliberation as well whether it is a form of scientific knowledge, or opinion, or skill in conjecture, or some other kind of thing. Scientific knowledge it is not; for men do not inquire about the things they know about, but good deliberation is a kind of deliberation, and he who deliberates inquires and calculates. Nor is it skill in conjecture; for this both involves no reasoning and is something that is quick in its operation, while men deliberate a long time, and they say that one should carry out quickly the conclusions of one's deliberation, but should deliberate slowly. Again, readiness of mind is different from excellence in deliberation; it is a sort of skill in conjecture. Nor again is excellence in deliberation opinion of any sort. But since the man who deliberates badly makes a mistake, while he who deliberates well does so correctly, excellence in deliberation is clearly a kind of correctness, but neither of knowledge nor of opinion; for there is no such thing as correctness of knowledge (since there is no such thing as error of knowledge), and correctness of opinion is truth; and at the same time everything that is an object of opinion is already determined. But again excellence in deliberation involves reasoning. The remaining alternative, then, is that it is correctness of thinking; for this is not yet assertion, since, while even opinion is not inquiry but has reached the stage of assertion, the man who is deliberating, whether he does so well or ill, is searching for something and calculating.
But excellence in deliberation is a certain correctness of deliberation; hence we must first inquire what deliberation is and what it is about. And, there being more than one kind of correctness, plainly excellence in deliberation is not any and every kind; for (1) the incontinent man and the bad man, if he is clever, will reach as a result of his calculation what he sets before himself, so that he will have deliberated correctly, but he will have got for himself a great evil. Now to have deliberated well is thought to be a good thing; for it is this kind of correctness of deliberation that is excellence in deliberation, viz. that which tends to attain what is good. But (2) it is possible to attain even good by a false syllogism, and to attain what one ought to do but not by the right means, the middle term being false; so that this too is not yet excellence in deliberation this state in virtue of which one attains what one ought but not by the right means. Again (3) it is possible to attain it by long deliberation while another man attains it quickly. Therefore in the former case we have not yet got excellence in deliberation, which is rightness with regard to the expedient -- rightness in respect both of the end, the manner, and the time. (4) Further it is possible to have deliberated well either in the unqualified sense or with reference to a particular end. Excellence in deliberation in the unqualified sense, then, is that which succeeds with reference to what is the end in the unqualified sense, and excellence in deliberation in a particular sense is that which succeeds relatively to a particular end. If, then, it is characteristic of men of practical wisdom to have deliberated well, excellence in deliberation will be correctness with regard to what conduces to the end of which practical wisdom is the true apprehension.
Book 6, Chapter 10
Understanding, also, and goodness of understanding, in virtue of which men are said to be men of understanding or of good understanding, are neither entirely the same as opinion or scientific knowledge (for at that rate all men would have been men of understanding), nor are they one of the particular sciences, such as medicine, the science of things connected with health, or geometry, the science of spatial magnitudes. For understanding is neither about things that are always and are unchangeable, nor about any and every one of the things that come into being, but about things which may become subjects of questioning and deliberation. Hence it is about the same objects as practical wisdom; but understanding and practical wisdom are not the same. For practical wisdom issues commands, since its end is what ought to be done or not to be done; but understanding only judges. (Understanding is identical with goodness of understanding, men of understanding with men of good understanding.) Now understanding is neither the having nor the acquiring of practical wisdom; but as learning is called understanding when it means the exercise of the faculty of knowledge, so 'understanding' is applicable to the exercise of the faculty of opinion for the purpose of judging of what some one else says about matters with which practical wisdom is concerned -- and of judging soundly; for 'well' and 'soundly' are the same thing. And from this has come the use of the name 'understanding' in virtue of which men are said to be 'of good understanding', viz. from the application of the word to the grasping of scientific truth; for we often call such grasping understanding.
Book 6, Chapter 11
What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to 'be sympathetic judges' and to 'have judgement', is the right discrimination of the equitable. This is shown by the fact that we say the equitable man is above all others a man of sympathetic judgement, and identify equity with sympathetic judgement about certain facts. And sympathetic judgement is judgement which discriminates what is equitable and does so correctly; and correct judgement is that which judges what is true.
Now all the states we have considered converge, as might be expected, to the same point; for when we speak of judgement and understanding and practical wisdom and intuitive reason we credit the same people with possessing judgement and having reached years of reason and with having practical wisdom and understanding. For all these faculties deal with ultimates, i.e. with particulars; and being a man of understanding and of good or sympathetic judgement consists in being able judge about the things with which practical wisdom is concerned; for the equities are common to all good men in relation to other men. Now all things which have to be done are included among particulars or ultimates; for not only must the man of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive reason is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and the last are objects of intuitive reason and not of argument, and the intuitive reason which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while the intuitive reason involved in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact, i.e. the minor premiss. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of the end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason.
This is why these states are thought to be natural endowments -- why, while no one is thought to be a philosopher by nature, people are thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, and intuitive reason. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to our time of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement; this implies that nature is the cause. (Hence intuitive reason is both beginning and end; for demonstrations are from these and about these.) Therefore we ought to attend to the undemonstrated sayings and opinions of experienced and older people or of people of practical wisdom not less than to demonstrations; for because experience has given them an eye they see aright.
We have stated, then, what practical and philosophic wisdom are, and with what each of them is concerned, and we have said that each is the virtue of a different part of the soul.
Book 6, Chapter 12
Difficulties might be raised as to the utility of these qualities of mind. For (1) philosophic wisdom will contemplate none of the things that will make a man happy (for it is not concerned with any coming into being), and though practical wisdom has this merit, for what purpose do we need it? Practical wisdom is the quality of mind concerned with things just and noble and good for man, but these are the things which it is the mark of a good man to do, and we are none the more able to act for knowing them if the virtues are states of character, just as we are none the better able to act for knowing the things that are healthy and sound, in the sense not of producing but of issuing from the state of health; for we are none the more able to act for having the art of medicine or of gymnastics. But (2) if we are to say that a man should have practical wisdom not for the sake of knowing moral truths but for the sake of becoming good, practical wisdom will be of no use to those who are good; again it is of no use to those who have not virtue; for it will make no difference whether they have practical wisdom themselves or obey others who have it, and it would be enough for us to do what we do in the case of health; though we wish to become healthy, yet we do not learn the art of medicine. (3) Besides this, it would be thought strange if practical wisdom, being inferior to philosophic wisdom, is to be put in authority over it, as seems to be implied by the fact that the art which produces anything rules and issues commands about that thing.
These, then, are the questions we must discuss; so far we have only stated the difficulties.
(1) Now first let us say that in themselves these states must be worthy of choice because they are the virtues of the two parts of the soul respectively, even if neither of them produce anything.
(2) Secondly, they do produce something, not as the art of medicine produces health, however, but as health produces health; so does philosophic wisdom produce happiness; for, being a part of virtue entire, by being possessed and by actualizing itself it makes a man happy.
(3) Again, the work of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral virtue; for virtue makes us aim at the right mark, and practical wisdom makes us take the right means. (Of the fourth part of the soul -- the nutritive -- there is no such virtue; for there is nothing which it is in its power to do or not to do.)
(4) With regard to our being none the more able to do because of our practical wisdom what is noble and just, let us begin a little further back, starting with the following principle. As we say that some people who do just acts are not necessarily just, i.e. those who do the acts ordained by the laws either unwillingly or owing to ignorance or for some other reason and not for the sake of the acts themselves (though, to be sure, they do what they should and all the things that the good man ought), so is it, it seems, that in order to be good one must be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the acts themselves. Now virtue makes the choice right, but the question of the things which should naturally be done to carry out our choice belongs not to virtue but to another faculty. We must devote our attention to these matters and give a clearer statement about them. There is a faculty which is called cleverness; and this is such as to be able to do the things that tend towards the mark we have set before ourselves, and to hit it. Now if the mark be noble, the cleverness is laudable, but if the mark be bad, the cleverness is mere smartness; hence we call even men of practical wisdom clever or smart. Practical wisdom is not the faculty, but it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of virtue, as has been said and is plain; for the syllogisms which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, viz. 'since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature', whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this is not evident except to the good man; for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good.
Book 6, Chapter 13
We must therefore consider virtue also once more; for virtue too is similarly related; as practical wisdom is to cleverness -- not the same, but like it -- so is natural virtue to virtue in the strict sense. For all men think that each type of character belongs to its possessors in some sense by nature; for from the very moment of birth we are just or fitted for selfcontrol or brave or have the other moral qualities; but yet we seek something else as that which is good in the strict sense -- we seek for the presence of such qualities in another way. For both children and brutes have the natural dispositions to these qualities, but without reason these are evidently hurtful. Only we seem to see this much, that, while one may be led astray by them, as a strong body which moves without sight may stumble badly because of its lack of sight, still, if a man once acquires reason, that makes a difference in action; and his state, while still like what it was, will then be virtue in the strict sense. Therefore, as in the part of us which forms opinions there are two types, cleverness and practical wisdom, so too in the moral part there are two types, natural virtue and virtue in the strict sense, and of these the latter involves practical wisdom. This is why some say that all the virtues are forms of practical wisdom, and why Socrates in one respect was on the right track while in another he went astray; in thinking that all the virtues were forms of practical wisdom he was wrong, but in saying they implied practical wisdom he was right. This is confirmed by the fact that even now all men, when they define virtue, after naming the state of character and its objects add 'that (state) which is in accordance with the right rule'; now the right rule is that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. All men, then, seem somehow to divine that this kind of state is virtue, viz. that which is in accordance with practical wisdom. But we must go a little further. For it is not merely the state in accordance with the right rule, but the state that implies the presence of the right rule, that is virtue; and practical wisdom is a right rule about such matters. Socrates, then, thought the virtues were rules or rational principles (for he thought they were, all of them, forms of scientific knowledge), while we think they involve a rational principle.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that it is not possible to be good in the strict sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral virtue. But in this way we may also refute the dialectical argument whereby it might be contended that the virtues exist in separation from each other; the same man, it might be said, is not best equipped by nature for all the virtues, so that he will have already acquired one when he has not yet acquired another. This is possible in respect of the natural virtues, but not in respect of those in respect of which a man is called without qualification good; for with the presence of the one quality, practical wisdom, will be given all the virtues. And it is plain that, even if it were of no practical value, we should have needed it because it is the virtue of the part of us in question; plain too that the choice will not be right without practical wisdom any more than without virtue; for the one deter, mines the end and the other makes us do the things that lead to the end.
But again it is not supreme over philosophic wisdom, i.e. over the superior part of us, any more than the art of medicine is over health; for it does not use it but provides for its coming into being; it issues orders, then, for its sake, but not to it. Further, to maintain its supremacy would be like saying that the art of politics rules the gods because it issues orders about all the affairs of the state.
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Is VirtueScience compatible with your Beliefs?
Why Study the Virtues?
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The Famous Pooltable Example
The Virtues and Vices: Natural Processes
The Book of Virtue
Randomly Generated Virtue Pairs
Virtues and Vices: Various Correspondences
Virtues of various traditions categorized by number
Vices of various traditions categorized by number
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Contemplation and Application of the Golden Rule
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1008 Virtue Meditations
A Commentary on the 1008 Virtue Meditations
Randomly Generated Virtue Pairs
Guest Articles
A Reaction to "Inner Medicine"
"Prumble"
A Compilation of over 300 Positive Words
The International Academy of Happiness
Empowerment By Design
You Are Not Your Personality
Exploring Beneath The Surface
Public Domain
Nicomachean Ethics
Moral Science: A Compendium of Ethics
Character
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Virtue Related links
The Number Database
The Ordering of Phenomena
Numbers and Synchronicity
Number Sayings
Number Laws
Number Types
Centered Polygonal Numbers
Polygonal Numbers
Prime Factor Calculator
Prime Factors
Primes
Pi in Other Bases
Number Partitions
The Platonic Solids
Archimedean Solids
Multi-Polygonal Numbers
Polytopes
Physics
Chemical Elements
Stable Isotopes
Numbers Related to Vegetation
Numbers Related to Animals
Numbers Related to the Human Body
Virtues arranged by Number
Vices arranged by Number
Numbers Related to Kabbalah
Books with Numbers in the Title
Films with Numbers in the Title
Songs with Numbers in the Title
Numbers Related to Games and Sport
General Number Trivia
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Geological Events
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Links to sites with Number Databases
The Physical Body
Diet: Virtues of Vegetarianism
Esoteric Diet
Diet: Exoteric and Esoteric
Breatharianism
Nutrition: The Properties of Minerals and Vitamins
A Fresh Look at Mantra Yoga
Neo Hatha Yoga
Prehistoric Yoga
Ban Pethidine
Guest Articles
The Origin of Ayurveda in the Cognitions of the Rishis
Baby- blinding and oxygen-rationing problems
Pranic Therapy
Public Domain
The Doctrine and Practice of Yoga
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Numbers and the Human Body
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Tactics and Self Defence
Universal Tactics
Universal Veiling Techniques
A New Martial Art called "Shhhhh"
2max: A Game of Survival
Permutational Moves in the Martial Arts
The 16 postures Martial Art
Martial Gain
Zero Friction Training
Silhouette Fighting
Weapons
Targets
The One Touch Principle
Why Attacked?
Effects On Enemy
Why Retreat?
Why Advance?
Orientation Limits and Agility
Tower Defence
Guest Articles
COMMITMENT: Teaching the Lessons of a Lifetime
Zen in the Martial Arts
The Importance of Friendship
Martial Arts Training: a Real-World Perspective
Self-Defense - Why Most Drop Out of Martial Arts
Key Moments & Phases in a Self-Defense Situation
Becoming a Student of an authentic Teacher
The Ninja's Mikkyo Magic of Asking "Why?"
The Power of the Leader Within
CHARACTER And the Ninja's Law of Interdependence
DECISIVENESS: Commitment to Greatness
ENGAGEMENT: Recognizing the Value of Training
ATTITUDE: FAILURE IS NOT AN OPTION!
Flexibility and Adaptibility
No Self-Defense Technique is Perfect
True Martial Arts and the Job of a Warrior
Long-Distance Martial Arts Training
Real Self-Defense: Making Sense of Chaos
Leadership: The Cornerstone of Success
Is All This Martial Arts Training Gear Necessary?
In the Martial Art of Ninjutsu - Practice Makes Perfect
A Leap In Precision Martial Arts Training Equipment
Budget Travel for Martial Arts Karate Tournaments
Notify Your Attacker That You Are Trained?
Public Domain
The Tao Te Ching
The Art of War by Sun Tzu
The Five Rings by Miyamoto Musashi
The Prince by Nicolo Machiavelli
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Self Defence Links
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World Events
The Cause of War
Who Owns the World?
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The Geopolitics of Food
Public Domain
The Empire of Russia by JOHN S.C. ABBOTT
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Mysteries of the World
Spring Heeled Jack
The Lam Entity
The Mothman
The Lock Ness Monster
The Kraken
The Yeti
The Chupacabra
The Mongolian Death Worm
Kongamoto
The "Exchange of Souls"
Case of the Hacker
Case of the Chinese Rocket
The Tunguska Event
The Roanoke Island Mystery
A Shape Shifting Artifact
Siribhoovalaya: Book of Books
Case of the Grooved Spheres
Case of the Dropa Stones
Ica Stones
Case of the Baghdad Battery
Mystery of the Antikythera Mechanism
Case of the Coso Artifact
Mystery of the Crystal Skulls
The Holy Grail
The Salzburg Cube
The Morrisonville Enigma
The Spear of Destiny
Case of the Nasca Lines
Mystery of the Coral Castle
The Stone Henge Mystery
The Devils Tower Mystery
The Great Pyramid
The Easter Island Heads
Guest Articles
Ghost Hunting 101
Real Ghosts and Quantum Physics
Public Domain
From the Caves and Jungles of Hindostan
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Websites About Unexplained Mysteries
The Esoteric Section
The Hebrew Alphabet: Its Inner Structure
The Magic Hexagon of the 19 Permutations
An Overview of the 7 Diagrams
Secrets of the Menorah
An Atlantean Diagram?
The Tetrahedron and the 5 Elements
The Sepher Yetzirah: an Original Interpretation
Profound Secrets of the Dodecahedron
The Tree of Life and the Four levels of Geometric Complexity
Speculations on the Tree of Life
Commentaries on the Tetragrammaton
The Chemical Elements
Pi in other Bases
Pascal's Triangle: Key to the Mysteries
Pascal's Triangle and Combinatorics
VirtueScience Mathematics
n-Dimensional Polytopes
Some thoughts on Number
Partition Theory
The n-dimensional Simplexes and Pascal's Triangle
The Simplexes
The Integer
Hyper Cubes and Combinatorics
The Undifferentiated Tao
The 3 Trinary Permutations
The 9 Trinary Permutations
The 27 Trinary Permutations
The Cube and Base 3
The transformation between base 3 and base 2
The 4 Binary Permutations
The 16 Binary Permutations
Is there a Pattern in the Prime Factors?
An Alternative to the 16 Geomantic Figures
The 64 Binary Permutations
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The Enneagram by Marko Rodin
Geometry: An Archetypal Form of Communication
Public Domain
Revelatio Secretorum Artis
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Esoteric Links Page
Healing Society
The Excalibur Project: Enhanced Democracy
The Global Mind Initiative
Mass Belief Systems and the Global Mind
Health Care
Secret Societies
Animal Welfare
Prisons
The Kali Yuga
World Peace
Technology and the Future of the Earth
Fountain International
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Emerging Technologies and Society
Public Domain
Utopia, by Thomas More
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Conceptual Science
The Coming Age of Concepts
The Origin of Meaning
The Universal Conceptual Matrix
The Next Generation of Messageboads
Conceptual Systems
Indra's Net
Conceptual Phonetics
Concepts are Containers
Universal Laws
Logical Fallacies
Basic Steps Towards Conceptual Organization
Deep Musings into Conceptual Science
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The Memetic Lexicon
The Jericho Road by W. Bion Adkins
Pythagoras and the Mathesis of Chaos
The Calculus of Logic by George Boole
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Scientific Theories
The Universal Frequency Triangle
Physics and Continual Creation
Is the Universe 2-Dimensional?
A Fresh Look at the Chemical Elements
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E=mc2 is Wrong-Einstein's Special Relativity Flawed
Is Quantum Physics the End of Dualism?
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Flatland
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Living Space/Environment
Ban Ironing!
Hairy Houses
Motivational Posters
Ticking Clocks
Cobbled Streets and Health
The Command Position: Beds
Artificial Calendars
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Global Warming: Is It Real?
Space Sunshade May Reduce Global Warming
The Environment: A Global Overview
Feng Shui Attracts Money
Feng Shui Cures
What is Vastu Shastra?
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Architecture and Democracy
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My published poem: 'Souler Systems'
"First Awakening": An Explanation
Mathematical Music
Herbal Painting
Art and Design on HubPages
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Native American Art and Its Spiritual Concept
Seven Simple Techniques For Acrylic Painting
Concrete Strategies For Getting Your Art Recognized
How to Make a Successful Acrylic Painting
Poem: Photograph
Poem: The Three Piece Suit
Poem: Orbs
Poem: The Black Hills of Dakota
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Modern Painting by George Moore
Poems by great Poets by Various
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Art Forums List
Spirituality
Nondual Vedanta of Kashmir
The Art of Venn
Spiritual Stories
VirtueScience and Nonduality
A Ramana Dream
The Virtues and Enlightenment
The Middle Path
The Golden Rule
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The Great Invocation
The Great Purification
Games
Quality Star Power
Pranic Therapy
The New Age Movement
Tantra - The Serpentine Ascent - (I)
Tantra -The Serpentine Ascent - (2)
Sitting In Surrender
Imitation Spirituality
A Selection of Poems
Is There..
Earth Rising
Abiding in the Heart
Public Domain
The Upanishads
CLAIRVOYANCE and Occult Powers
The Roots of Good and Evil
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Advaita Links
Notable Women
I Am the One and Only
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Websites containing Lists of Gurus etc
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Shamanism/Magick
CyberShamanism
The Lucid Dream Computer
Cyber Shamanism
Yantra Goggles
Possible Futures for Music
Parasitic Entities
Beware of Channeled Material
The Magick Powers Trap<
Real Psychic Protection
Magnifying Intent
Guest Articles
The Anatomy of Ritual, Spellwork, and Magick
Low Magick and High Magick
Ceremonial Magick (Myths of Ceremonial Magick)
The Truth About Magick Spells, Everyone Has Magickal Abilities!
Psychic Self-Defense Explained - How To Use Magick And Runes
Public Domain
How to Read the Crystal or, Crystal and Seer
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Gemstones and Character Improvement
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Gemstones and Chemical Elements
Optimizing Gemstones
Permutational-Gemstone Therapy
Without Gemstones
Natural Vs Synthetic Gemstones
Gemstone Enhanced Herbs
Determining Gemstone Effects
Purifying Gemstone Vibrations
Gemstones and Saced Places
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Crystal/Gemstone Therapy
Effective Use of Gems in Astrology
Bling Therapy - Healing With Gemstones
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Financial Freedom
Opportunity Magnet 101Are Your Vices Costing You Money?
Redundant Vows and their Effect on Financial Security
False Needs, False Wants
FindMyFiver.com
Guest Articles
Giant Steps to Financial Freedom
5 Strategies for Selling in a Tough Market
Is Financial Freedom Through Thought Really Possible?
Digital Signage Market Poised to Skyrocket
Public Domain
Think and Grow Rich by Napoleon Hill
The Art of Money Getting by P. T. Barnum (Phineas Taylor), 1810-1891
How to Get on in the World by Major A.R. Calhoon
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