Home · Book Reports · 2017 · The Future of the Army - Today, Tomorrow, and the Day After Tomorrow

designates my notes. / designates important.

Thoughts

An interesting opinion of how the future Army might look. There is a lot of misleading information. The budgetary “declines” and how Arab Spring was supposed to be a good thing for the ME. A good destabilizing event sure, but… Lots of mention of terrorists and boogie men. MIC gonna MIC I guess. I was surprised to see the author detailing how poor Army navigation skills are in the face of GPS and like ilk even though they understand how a “real” opponent would almost certainly degrade the C4I (tech, nav, comms, etc) systems. Directed energy weapons, solar power, AI (in the command center), and drones/robots all seem pretty straightforward.

The authors cite themselves extensively.

Sept. 2016

pdf page numbers

Executive Summary

page 4:

• Threats have burgeoned in the last five years as great power politics have reasserted themselves, global terrorism and extremism is on the rise, and turmoil in the Middle East has replaced the hopes of the Arab Spring. The world has become a much more dangerous place.

• Turmoil = disruption via MIC

• hopes of Arab Spring = turmoil

• We have one overriding goal: to ensure that the US Army remains the preeminent fighting force in the world for the remainder of this century.

page 5:

• Since the Army today is based almost entirely at home, it needs to reinvest in prepositioned overseas combat stocks; prepare to fight for overseas staging areas; improve strategic mobility exercises; and press to station more forces overseas. 2020-2025

• Master urban operations. More than half of the world’s population already lives in urban areas, and that percentage will only increase in the coming decades. In order to prepare for this challenging operational environment, the Army should designate units to specialize in urban operations and improve training for large-scale urban combat. 2020-2025

• Prepare for the next big war. The Army needs to upgrade, access, and prepare to employ surplus weaponry; plan to control large areas and populations; rebuild resilience in the force; and plan for unit regeneration. 2020-2025

• Transform Army culture. Effective adaptability will require the Army to accept more risk; reinstitute “power down;” decrease tolerance of bureaucracy; reduce excessive deference to rank and position; reject Army anti-intellectualism; and strengthen ethics and integrity.

• Embrace advanced technologies and experimentation. This includes enabling greater experimentation in operational units; building training around virtual reality and its successors; integrating battlefield robotics and artificial intelligence into the close fight; building new battle staff processes around artificial intelligence; and investing in advanced technologies for power and munitions.

Introduction

page 6:

• The unrestrained aggressiveness of a resurgent Russia and a rising China threaten US allies in both Europe and the Pacific. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) as a pressing international terror threat has eclipsed al- Qaeda in danger and lethal effectiveness.

• Russia should stop being encircled by NATO, NATO shouldn’t stop encircling Russia.

• The now-2045 timeline, divided into 3 parts, all overlap.

page 7:

1. THE ARMY’S WORLD IN 2016

• Global instability is on the rise, and regional powers such as Iran and North Korea, whose interests are inimical to the United States, continue to demand the attention of the US military.

• The US demands the kowtowing of N. Korean and Iran.

• the August 2011 Budget Control Act (BCA) and its sequestration mechanism limited the resources that would be available to DOD for the following decade.

• This only stopped (reduced?) future increases, no resources were removed.

• The BCA’s mandated budget caps and sequestration took effect on January 1, 2013, which required DOD to cut approximately $500 billion from its planned base budget through the next ten years.5 Congress has increased the BCA’s mandated spending caps twice, but the resulting budgets have still fallen short of planned levels.6

• I was PLANNING to spend 10 trillion dollars, if someone would give it to me… BTW we actually had 2 budget increases under sequestration.

• The authors (David Barno and Nora Bensahel) cite their own works…

• The major problem, however, is that growing internal costs.

page 8:

• Russia’s surprise annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and promotion of separatist movements in eastern Ukraine posed an unexpected challenge to the United States and a direct threat to its NATO allies.

• Didn’t Crimea vote to join Russia?

• China has become increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea. Its many provocative actions have included landing military jets on newly created artificial islands and harassing ships with its maritime militia. 10

• How dare China build and use artificial islands! Once again the authors cite themselves.

• [ISIS arrives on the scene in] August 2014 when it released an extremely graphic video of the beheading of James Foley, a US citizen whom it was holding hostage.12

• The video does NOT show a beheading. Fade to black before any blood, then a poorly faked body and head (again with no blood) are displayed.

• The increased globalization of technology and communications means that for the first time in history, terrorist groups and malevolent individuals can reach the United States from almost any part of the world—as was seen all too clearly on 9/11, and reinforced by the recent terror attacks in Paris, Brussels, San Bernardino, and Orlando.

• Wasn’t 9/11 done with box cutter technology? Bombs and guns are new tech?

• In many ways, the United States has entered an era of perpetual war,17 since it will have to continue addressing the various manifestations of this threat for years and probably decades to come.

• Entered an era of perpetual war? USA has been at war since the beginning.

page 9:

• must simultaneously maintain its already numerous global commitments, for which 186,000 soldiers are currently deployed in 140 locations around the world.19

• World cop…

• peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and the Sinai

• Do as we say, or we’ll “keep the peace”.

• Army Chief of Staff General Mark Milley recently testified to Congress that the total Army of 980,000 soldiers is operating at “high military risk,” and that the Army would need around 1.2 million soldiers “in order to reduce to significant or moderate risk.”20

• the Army will continue to operate its 1980s-era M1 tanks, M2/3 Bradley fighting vehicles, and numerous other aging weapons systems until nearly mid-century. Even with all the upgrades and improvements to these systems over the past decades, they are reaching the end of their effective service life and are losing their ability to overmatch ever-more capable adversary systems.

• What systems do ISIS/terrorists have? Russia sure, but again Russia isn’t surrounding NATO…

page 10:

• [less money] comes atop a decade of failed major Army programs

• 10 years of failed programs? Increase the budget!

page 11:

• Throughout most of the nation’s history, war and peace were binary conditions.35 The United States went to war, in World War II or Korea or even Vietnam, and came home to relative peacetime once those wars reached a clear end. That is no longer true. After fifteen years, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are still continuing today (though in different forms and with fewer troops).

• It is easier to have endless war when your enemy is the boogie man, I mean terrorists. The authors once again cite themselves.

page 12:

• [In the peacetime after each previous war] Even though the Army often did not predict the next war correctly, that period of time, reflection, and investment helped make it more of ready to adapt to the next set of challenges it faced.

• We’ve got the predictions right this time, out to 2045 in fact!

• Save a major strategic shift after the presidential election, the US will continue to be a global leader with major international security responsibilities

• Responsibility to whom?

• defending US vital interests around the world and maintaining an open global order.

• Unless there is a massive international crisis or a direct attack on the United crisis States, the defense budget will remain capped by the BCA with little prospect for substantial growth,

• PNAC said the same thing months before 9/11…

page 13:

2. THE ARMY TODAY: 2016-2020

page 18:

• if the mobilization policy for units from the Reserve Component were to change, for example, from one year available to deploy for every five at home (1:5) to one year available for every four at home (1:4), the number of National Guard units available to deploy would increase by approximately 15 percent

• The Army National Guard is already planning to establish eleven Cyber Protection Teams (CPTs) spread across twenty-four states by 2019, which will help prevent and respond to cyber incidents on DOD and government networks.60

page 19:

• the Army should undertake wargames and exercises to validate its ability to both respond to weapons of mass destruction and the breakdown of civil order in the United States for worst- case scenarios.

• An extensive breakdown of utilities, the large-scale disruption of civil order, or mass civilian casualties would almost certainly engage much of the Army in providing extensive support to civil authorities throughout the country.

• There is no backstop for the nation if the Army cannot successfully fight a major war when such a conflict erupts.

• Something about a gun behind every blade of grass…

page 21:

• The Army and the other services now rely almost entirely on space- based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) support for most essential battlefield tasks. C4I tech.

• C4I stands for command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence.

• Basic leader courses must continue to emphasize navigating with maps and compasses, communicating by radio, and exercising command and control using pens, map overlays, and even messengers to backstop what could be debilitating technical reliance.

page 22:

• almost 80 percent of Army headquarters do not contribute directly to wartime missions. 75

page 23:

• Need to take advantage of IT/automation.

page 26:

• The Army should also identify what civilian talents and capabilities it might want to rapidly access if the Selective Service were to institute a draft. These might include computer coders, social media gurus, linguists, and financial experts, in addition to more traditional demands for soldiers to fill infantry, armor, or artillery units. 100

• 100 David Barno and Nora Bensahel, “Why We Still Need the Draft,” War on the Rocks, February 23, 2016 David Wood, “Uncle Sam Needs Coders. Here’s How the Military Could Draft Them,” Huffington Post, May 10, 2016,

page 27:

3. THE ARMY OF TOMORROW: 2020-2025

• Today’s world of haves and have nots will be greatly magnified, with those fortunate enough to have employment and access to stunning technology living in stark contrast to the hundreds of millions struggling to survive in disrupted environments.

• 80% of world slated to have smart phone by 2025.

page 31:

• Army leaders must start publicly making the case for why more Army units need to be permanently stationed overseas in places beyond Eastern Europe.

• By 2030, over 60 percent of the world’s population will live in urban areas, 114

• The Army must significantly improve its capabilities for urban offense, defense, mobility, and protection, so that it can operate effectively in densely packed metropolitan areas where civilian populations are a part of the battlefield.

• These missions may often resemble the “three block war” that Marine General 116Charles Krulak famously described, where forces may fight, conduct peacekeeping, and provide humanitarian aid on adjacent city blocks—all under the scrutiny of international media, and now among a social-networked populace.

page 32:

• holding tactical exercises without troops for leaders in large urban areas, 118 conducting map exercises overlaid on actual cities, and possibly even conducting full scale exercises in abandoned parts of big cities.

• 118 Tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) were held in real cities during the Cold War. They helped Army leaders, who were often wearing civilian clothes, think through how large formations would conduct combat operations in such complex terrain. For more on TEWTs, see Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 25-4: How to Conduct Training Exercises, September 10, 1984, chapter three.

• The Army must also invest more heavily in technological solutions to this problem, especially in virtual reality gaming that replicates the high stress demands of operating in densely populated areas. It should develop sophisticated urban simulations for full-scale unit training exercises to compensate for the inability to conduct large physical exercises. Artificial intelligence can also help replicate the behavior of leaders, factions, and the general population of a virtual city in order to better challenge units with the scope and complexity of large-scale urban operations.

• US military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan included no more than 171,000 troops and 100,000 troops respectively. 120 Compare that with the more than 537,000 US troops deployed at the height of the Vietnam War121—which was considered a small-scale, limited conflict at the time.

page 33:

• Plan to Control Large Areas and Populations

page 34:

• The Army’s “Big Five” weapons systems were first fielded during the 1980s defense buildup. 131 Upgraded versions of each of those weapons—the M1 tank, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, the Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, and the Patriot air defense system—still constitute the core of the Army’s combat capabilities today. And because of the Army’s many modernization failures (discussed in chapter two), no replacements are currently programmed for any of these systems. That means that most or all of them will remain in service through 2030 and beyond.

page 35:

• V-22 Osprey

• Bell V-280 Valor and variants of the Boeing-Sikorsky X2 … cannot effectively protect themselves from direct fire and advanced missiles.

page 37:

4. THE ARMY OF THE DAY AFTER TOMORROW: 2025-2040+

• Making linear projections based on the current environment will be useless at best and dangerous at worst, since the world order may be dominated by major factors whose outlines are only faint glimmers now. US global power will almost certainly decline in relative terms, and perhaps also in absolute terms, as the last bits of the post-World War II Pax Americana recede into history. Yet, the United States will still play an essential role—and possibly an even more important role—in maintaining an open international system

• Many positive trends will improve broad aspects of the human condition in unprecedented ways.

• Maybe 70 hour work weeks and virtual reality?

• By 2040, the world population will be continuing its inexorable march toward ten billion people. 146

• So says the U.N., but many populations are on the SHARP decline already. See: importation of migrants to Europe and USA to support the economics of declining demographics. Also, Japan…

• Climate change.. cities underwater.. migrants.. yawn.

• 3D printing, artificial intelligence, crowdsourcing, robots, = less need to work, but also talks about a poor economy. Again, still waiting for that 20 hour work week and Jetson’s lifestyle always riiiight around the corner.

page 38:

• After telling me he doesn’t know what the future will hold by 2040, the author then describes, in great detail, how the world will be in 2040.

page 39:

• Micromanaging kills moral and effectiveness. If C4I (fancy comms, gps, etc) were lost, the junior leaders would fail. Needs to reimplement “power down”, giving more authority to NCOs and the like.

page 42:

• A 2015 study by two highly respected Army War College professors found that it was “literally impossible” for Army officers to meet all the requirements imposed on them by higher headquarters, yet also found that failing to meet those same requirements was professionally unacceptable. 170 The result is a pattern of pervasive dishonesty, false reporting, and widespread rationalization of cheating in order to meet unachievable service requirements. This situation is unacceptable in a professional force that holds itself to the highest standards of conduct and accountability. It shatters trust between seniors and subordinates by condoning an environment of fundamental dishonesty.

• This is the same thing we see in the broader society, and possibly world, lie, cheat, and steal to “win”.

page 43:

• Smaller units with reduced electronic and physical signatures and that can move rapidly from place to place will be better able to avoid detection and destruction.

• The lines between military and civilian, active and reserves, volunteers and retirees need to become far more blurred.

• By 2040, Army personnel should be able to step in and out of the force at different times in their careers or personal lives. A computer coder, for example, might choose to serve on active duty for three years after college, revert to the IRR during the next few years while gaining valuable experience among the private sector, and later shift to active drill status to serve as a military cyber-warrior several nights a week while building a new technology startup.

page 46:

• The Army should invest in building this technology [virtual reality] as the backbone of its individual, unit, and staff training models as soon as practicable

• In the next decade and beyond, however, smart robots empowered by AI will be able to serve as capable partners to soldiers engaged in the dangerous close fight.

• Entirely new battle staff processes could be designed around AI capabilities, removing people and time from analysis and course of action formulation.

page 47:

• Directed energy (DE) weapons, by contrast, would provide a nearly inexhaustible source of ammunition and so would slash resupply requirements. The Army is currently deploying limited numbers of DE weapons to defend against drones and incoming rockets, artillery, and mortars. 187